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ABSTRACT 
 
Power system management in response to extreme events is one the most 
important operational aspects of power systems. In this thesis, a novel Event-driven 
Security Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC) model and a statistical method, based 
on regression and data mining to estimate the system components outages, are proposed. 
The proposed models help consider the simultaneous outage of several system 
components represented by an N-1-m reliability criterion and accordingly determine the 
proper system response. In addition, an optimal microgrid placement model with the 
objective of minimizing the cost of unserved energy to enhance power system resilience 
is proposed.  
The numerical simulations on the standard IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118-bus test 
systems exhibit the merits and applicability of the proposed E-SCUC model, as well as 
the advantages of the data mining approach in estimating component outage, and the 
effectiveness of the optimal microgrid placement in ensuring an economic operation 
under normal conditions and a resilient operation under contingency cases.  
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Extreme events, including severe weather events and natural disasters, result in 
significant economic, social, and physical disruptions and cause considerable 
inconvenience for residents living in disaster areas. To address this issue, the topic of 
power grid resilience has gained significant attention in recent years. Power grid 
resilience is defined as the grid capability to withstand low-probability high-impact 
events by minimizing possible power outages and then quickly returning to its normal 
operating state. 
Power system operators commonly rely on a security-constrained unit 
commitment (SCUC) to schedule the available generation resources needed to meet the 
forecasted load and addressing prevailing system constraints in response to limited 
components unavailability. Although widely used and proved viable, the SCUC solution 
cannot guarantee a useful solution when the system is subject to extreme events, i.e. 
severe weather events and natural disasters. In other words, even though a secure solution 
is obtained, the solution does not ensure the grid resilience in response to the extreme 
event. Considering this issue, and the growing number and intensity of extreme events, 
this study proposes and formulates an Event-driven SCUC (E-SCUC) model which 
ensures a resilient supply of loads, even in the case of multiple component outages. 
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An accurate estimation of the component outages, however, is of ultimate 
importance in ensuring a viable resource schedule. Along with the proposed E-SCUC 
method, a kernel density estimation method, based on regression and data mining, is used 
to estimate and model the system components that can potentially fail during a predicted 
hurricane. The model is trained on artificial data and historical data from storm-related 
damages to predict component outages, where the prediction is further used in the 
proposed E-SCUC problem. 
In addition, microgrids, as small-scale power systems with the ability of self-
supply and islanding, are perceived as attractive investment options for both electrical 
system operators and end-use consumers due to the many economic, reliability, and 
energy efficiency benefits that they offer. One specific benefit of microgrids, which 
makes them extremely attractive, is the potential to improve resilience. The installation of 
microgrids in the proper places in power systems can be considered as a viable solution 
to power system resilience. Considering this issue and the growing number and intensity 
of extreme events, we developed a microgrid optimal placement model that determines 
the optimal size and location of microgrids in power systems to maximize system 
resilience. The model is developed considering multiple component outages and limited 
investment budget. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follow:  Section 1.1 reviews the importance 
of power system resilience and introduces some of the existing work on improving power 
system resilience. Section 1.3 presents the literature on data driven approaches in system 
resilience and introduces the Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) method to estimate and 
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model the system components that can potentially fail during a predicted hurricane. The 
importance of microgrids in power system resilience is presented in Section 1.3. Finally, 
an overview of the contributions in this thesis are presented in Section 1.4. 
 
1.1. Power System Resilience 
Extreme events, including severe weather events and natural disasters, result in 
significant economic, social, and physical disruptions, and cause considerable 
inconvenience for residents living in disaster areas due to loss of critical lifeline systems 
(Winkler et al. 2010). The electricity infrastructure has always been significantly 
impacted by extreme events as it is dispersed over a vast geographical area to transfer the 
electric energy generated by large-scale power plants to a variety of customers via 
transmission and distribution networks. The resulting power outages shut down 
businesses, impede emergency services, and cost the economy billions of dollars annually 
in lost output and wages, delayed production, inconvenience, and damage to the 
infrastructure (Executive Office of the President 2015). The topic of power grid 
resilience, i.e., the grid capability to withstand low-probability high-impact events by 
minimizing possible power outages and quickly returning to normal operating state (Karl 
2009), has gained significant attention in recent years.  
The importance of improving resilience in power systems is widely discussed in 
the literature; however, the mathematical modeling of optimal scheduling of available 
resources based on resilience considerations and efficient modeling of weather related 
incidents is limited. In (Ball 2006), a case study on hurricane planning and rebuilding the 
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electrical infrastructure along the Gulf Coast for hurricane Katrina was presented. In (D. 
Reed et al. 2009), the interdependency of electricity and telecommunication 
infrastructures is considered during extreme events, and the resilience of networked 
infrastructures is analyzed. A resilience index for large infrastructures using belief 
functions is modeled in (Attoh-Okine et al. 2009) and a variety of qualitative 
explanations to address and analyze the system vulnerability is proposed. In (Arab, 
Khodaei, Han, et al. 2015), a framework for proactive recovery of electric power assets 
with the primary objective of resilience enhancement is introduced. The proposed 
framework develops outage models to indicate the impact of hurricanes on power system 
components, a stochastic pre-hurricane model for managing resources before the event, 
and a deterministic post-hurricane recovery model for managing resources after the event. 
One important issue, which is typically overlooked in resilience studies, is the 
significant role of available generation units in ensuring a rapid and timely recovery of 
power system assets. This issue is discussed in (Arab et al. 2014) where impact of 
potential damage due to hurricanes is incorporated in the power system maintenance 
scheduling problem. The proposed model considers component deterioration, failure due 
to loss of reliability and hurricane damages, and the interrelationship between the 
components and the grid. The objective is to find a simultaneous cost-effective unit 
commitment (UC) and hurricane planning for preventive maintenance when the 
components fail due to degradation or hurricanes. It is concluded that the saving cost due 
to implementing the preventive maintenance program is significant and it is necessary to 
include resilience in UC. 
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1.2. Data Driven Approaches in System Resilience 
In the context of data driven approaches to predict power system outages in 
response to hurricanes, the hurricane disruption in terms of number of outages and 
customers affected, geographic distribution and duration, causes of outages, and types of 
equipment affected, are studied in (Davidson et al. 2003). The study is based on large 
databases of outages in five hurricanes in Carolina. In (D. A. Reed 2008) data logs of the 
repair crews were plotted in GIS to study outage duration, fragilities, and restoration of 
an urban distribution system located in the U.S. Pacific Northwest that was affected by 
four winter storms. In (Nateghi, Guikema, and Quiring 2014), an ensemble learning 
method for regression (i.e. random decision forests) is proposed to forecast the 
power outage durations. The power outage duration models are developed and validated 
for outages caused by Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, and Ivan in a central Gulf Coast state. 
In (Guikema et al. 2014), a hurricane power outage prediction model is introduced and 
claimed to be applicable along the full U.S. coastline. The model is trained on only 
publicly available data, and is further used to estimate the impacts of a number of historic 
storms, including Sandy and Typhoon Haiyan. 
Considering the large number and the frequent occurrence of hurricanes in the 
U.S., which results in a considerable amount of data, machine learning methods could be 
of significant use. Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) method, as a non-parametric way to 
estimate the probability density function of a random variable, is used for this purpose 
(Parzen 1962). This method is commonly used in data mining, data smoothing, cluster 
analysis, image processing, signal processing, and econometrics (Guidoum 2013). In this 
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case of study, KDE is used to analyze the historical hurricane and power system outage 
data and accordingly estimate the probability of failure for power system components in 
response to future events based on the center and the category of the hurricane 
 
1.3. Microgrids 
Microgrids, as small-scale power systems with the ability of self-supply and 
islanding, are perceived as attractive investment options for both electrical system 
operators and end-use consumers due to the many economic, reliability, and energy 
efficiency benefits that they offer. One specific benefit of microgrids, which makes them 
extremely attractive, is the potential to improve resilience. Power grid resilience 
represents the grid capability to withstand low-probability high-impact events by 
minimizing possible power outages and quickly returning to normal operating state 
(Executive Office of the President 2015). The topic of power grid resilience has received 
significant attention over the years as low-probability high-impact events, such as severe 
weather events and natural disasters, resulting in significant socioeconomic disruptions 
due to loss of critical infrastructure systems (Karl 2009). The power system is one of 
these critical infrastructures that has always been significantly impacted by extreme 
events, conceivably due to dispersion over vast geographical area to transfer the electric 
energy to consumers. The power outages caused by extreme events cost billions of 
dollars annually as a result of lost output, delayed production, and damage to the 
infrastructure (Executive Office of the President 2015). A study on rebuilding the power 
grid along the Gulf Coast, in response to hurricane Katrina, is presented in (Ball 2006). A 
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new attack scenario is introduced in (Zhu et al. 2014), which considers a practical attack 
strategy based on attack graph to evaluate the power grid resilience. The interdependency 
of electricity and telecommunication infrastructures are considered during extreme events 
in (D. A. Reed, Kapur, and Christie 2009), where the resilience of networked 
infrastructures is further analyzed. A resilience index for large infrastructures using belief 
functions is modeled in (Attoh-Okine et al. 2009) and a variety of qualitative 
explanations to address and analyze the system vulnerability is proposed. The study in 
(Arab, Khodaei, Khator, et al. 2015) proposes a model for repair and restoration of 
potential damages to the power system based on a proactive resource allocation, which is 
modeled as a stochastic integer program and decomposed by the Benders decomposition 
to handle computation burden. A framework for proactive recovery of electric power 
assets is introduced in (Arab, Khodaei, Han, et al. 2015), seeking to enhance the grid 
resilience. Outage models are introduced, along with stochastic/deterministic models for 
managing resources in pre-/post-hurricane stages. The role of available generation units 
in ensuring the desired level of grid resilience is an important issue that is commonly 
ignored in these studies, but however, needs to be further taken into account. The 
significant role of generation units availability in ensuring a timely recovery is discussed 
in (Arab et al. 2014), where the likely damages due to extreme events is integrated with 
the maintenance scheduling problem. Component deterioration, failure due to extreme 
events, and the interdependency between the components and the grid are further 
considered in the proposed model, and accordingly, a simultaneous cost-effective unit 
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commitment (UC) and hurricane planning for preventive maintenance was achieved. The 
study concluded that it is imperative to include resilience as part of the UC problem. 
There are limited mathematical studies in the literature on the impact of 
microgrids on the power grid resilience. A comprehensive study of state-of-the-art 
methods of resilience in microgrids can be found in (Parhizi et al. 2015). The problem of 
integrating distributed generators (DG) to microgrids from an economic and reliable 
planning perspective is investigated in (Xu et al. 2014). A multi-objective optimization 
model which includes resilience by considering network capacity for self-recovery to a 
new normal state after an extreme event is introduced in (Cano-Andrade et al. 2012). A 
composite sustainability/resilience index is calculated using fuzzy logic which allows 
expression of sustainability and resilience indices in the same units. A resilience-oriented 
microgrid optimal scheduling model is proposed in (Khodaei 2014), which schedules 
available resources in case of utility grid supply interruption to minimize the microgrid 
load curtailments. The study in (Che and Shahidehpour 2014) suggests that by deploying 
microgrids in strategic locations, the power grid resilience can be enhanced.  
In this model, the cost of lost loads, the repair cost, and the generation costs were 
considered as economic indices. The model suggested that investing on restoration 
resources can be paid off by securing expedited recovery. In resilience studies, ensuring 
adequate available generation plays an important role, which indicates the importance of 
unit commitment and economic dispatch studies. This issue is discussed in (Arab et al. 
2014), where the impact of potential damage due to hurricanes is incorporated in the 
power system maintenance-scheduling problem. The proposed model considers 
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component deterioration and also failure due to loss of reliability and failure due to 
hurricane damages. The objective is to find a simultaneous cost-effective unit 
commitment and hurricane planning for preventive maintenance when the components 
fail due to degradation or hurricanes. In the context of microgrid applications for power 
system resilience enhancement, limited work can be found in the literature, mainly 
focusing on the resilience improvement as a complimentary value proposition of 
microgrids. In (Xu et al. 2014), a case study of integrating distributed generators (DGs) to 
microgrids is investigated from a planning perspective which is modeled as an 
optimization problem with objectives of vulnerability, reliability, and economy. The 
optimization model is solved by a hybrid approach that combines multi-agent system and 
particle swarm optimization. However, the model is complicated and it is possible that 
the employed evolutionary method stops in a local minima. In (Cano-Andrade et al. 
2012), a multi-objective resilience model is proposed in order to account for the capacity 
of the network to self-recover to a normal state after a natural disaster. The study in 
(Khodaei 2014) aims at minimizing the microgrid load curtailments by scheduling 
available resources when supply of power from the utility grid is interrupted. This study 
considers uncertainties in load, renewable generation, as well as the time and the duration 
of the electricity interruptions from the utility grid. This model is one of the few 
mathematical models of the microgrid optimal scheduling problem based on resilience 
considerations which uses a decomposition method to decouple the problem into two 
operational problems, i.e., normal and resilient. A comprehensive study of microgrids 
application in providing grid support is provided in (Parhizi et al. 2015). 
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1.4. Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
1.4.1. Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC) 
An Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC) model is 
proposed which considers the probabilistic damage model of the system components, 
develops proper scenarios to model the impact of forecasted extreme events on 
component outages, and determines the commitment and dispatch of available generation 
units to ensure an economic operation under normal conditions and a resilient operation 
under contingency cases. The focus on this study will be on hurricanes; however, the 
proposed models can be applied to other types of extreme events, without loss of 
generality, knowing the probability of arrival and damage on the system components. 
Unlike the current daily practice in system resource scheduling in which N-1 or N-2 
reliability criteria are considered, the proposed E-SCUC allows for consideration of an 
extended number of outages, i.e., N-1-m, where m is determined in this study using 
probabilistic methods.  
 
1.4.2. Component Outage Estimation Based on Statistical Learning  
Since accurate estimation of the component outages is importance in planning and 
scheduling power systems especially during an extreme event, a Kernel Density 
Estimation (KDE) method is proposed and used to estimate component outages. As there 
are only a few publicly available datasets on the impact of the hurricanes on power 
system components, the proposed method is applied on artificial data to estimate the 
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probability of components failures. The obtained component outages are further 
integrated to a developed E-SCUC model to find the optimal schedule of available 
resources that not only minimizes the operation cost but also lowers the system total load 
curtailment.  
1.4.3. Role of Microgrids in Power System Resilience 
In this study, an optimal microgrid placement model to enhance power system 
resilience is proposed. The size and location of microgrids are determined in order to 
minimize the load curtailments within the power system following hurricanes. The 
probabilistic failure model of the system components is considered to develop proper 
scenarios in order to model the impact of hurricanes on component outages. Moreover, 
this model characterizes a resilient operation under contingency cases. Microgrids are 
considered as aggregated and flexible loads from the system operator’s perspective and 
their response to component outages are accordingly modeled. The proposed work 
follows the grid modernization plans of many electric utilities in the U.S., such as 
Commonwealth Edison in Chicago, to build microgrids in strategic places in order to 
address the negative impacts of extreme weather events and improve system resilience 
(Paaso, Svachula, and Bahramirad 2015), (Paaso, Liao, and Cramer 2015) . 
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2. CHAPTER TWO: POWER GRID MANAGEMENT 
In this chapter, the model outline and formulation of the proposed approaches to 
enhance power system resilience are presented. Section 2.1 presents the proposed Event-
driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC) problem and introduces two 
new proposed reliability criteria i.e. N-m and N-1-m. The formulation of the proposed E-
SCUC is discussed in Section 2.1.1.  
The proposed approach of component outage estimation based on the KDE is 
introduced in Section 2.2. Section 2.2.1 introduces Saffir-Simpson’s category of 
hurricanes, and the formulation of the proposed Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) 
method to estimate component outages is discussed in Section 2.2.2. 
Once the probable damages to system components are estimated, the buses in 
which microgrids are to be placed will be determined with the objective of minimizing 
the system total load curtailments. The role of microgrids in power system resilience and 
optimal microgrid placement formulation are presented in Section 2.3. 
 
2.1. Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC) 
Figure 2-1 depicts the outline of the proposed E-SCUC model. The problem is 
solved in two consecutive stages. Stage 1 forecasts the path and the intensity of the 
hurricane that is headed toward the power system and accordingly identifies the potential
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regions that will be impacted by this event. Knowing the potential regions to be impacted 
and the power system components in that region, the outage probability of each 
component will be calculated. Using this probability, the set of components on outage in 
each region will be estimated. Once the probable damages to system components are 
estimated, Stage 2 solves the E-SCUC problem considering an N-1-m reliability criterion, 
in which N is the total number of components in the power system and m is the number of 
identified component outages in each region. In other words, the model simultaneously 
considers the power system security in response to the single component outage (N-1) 
and also in response to the outage of m components in impacted regions.  
 
FIGURE 2-1- PROPOSED E-SCUC MODEL  
 
The component state is considered as a random variable, representing two states 
of outage and operational. Variety of probability distribution models have been proposed 
to model weather-related outage rate and probability of damage of power system 
components (Arab et al. 2014; Abiri-Jahromi et al. 2013). For example, the Poisson 
Component outage estimation 
- Determine outage probability of impacted 
components, and the associated time to repair 
Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit 
Commitment 
- Optimal scheduling of available resources  
- Preventive commitment and corrective dispatch 
 
Component outages 
- Forecast the path/intensity of the hurricane and 
identifying the regions to be impacted  
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distribution is used to model the hurricane arrival rate in (Lu and Garrido 2005) and 
(Arab et al. 2014). Also, along with hurricane arrival rate, the maximum wind gust speed 
that the component is able to withstand needs to be considered to evaluate the probability 
of outage. Hurricanes in general exhibit spatial and temporal dependence structures. 
Spatial dependence refers to the fact that locations within some distance from the path of 
the event will encounter rather similar impact patterns, and temporal dependence refers to 
the consecutive periods that will encounter similar behavior from the event until it is 
passed. Various methods have been studied for the statistical modeling of extreme events 
in space and time using max-stable model with deterministic storm shapes (Smith 1990), 
pairwise censored likelihood (Huser and Davison 2014), and spatial intensity function of 
the background occurrences for earthquakes (Zhuang, Ogata, and Vere-Jones 2002). This 
study relies on the existing literature to determine the shape of the hurricane, and 
accordingly, focuses on the components’ probability of outage. It is assumed that the 
components in center of the hurricane have higher probability of outage with lower 
probability of outage in neighboring locations. The impacted region may contain 
generation units, transmission lines, substations, and load sites. Therefore, it is possible 
that more than one component are on outage due to the hurricane.  
It is common to use the N-1 criterion for reliability studies in power systems, 
where N in the total number of components in the system. This criterion expresses that 
the network should be designed such that all the loads are seamlessly supplied in case of 
a single component outage at any given time. Following a hurricane, more than one 
component can be out of service; accordingly, the N-1 criterion cannot guarantee the 
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desired operation. To address this issue, this study employs an extended criterion, i.e., N-
m, to consider the simultaneous outage of m components. The N-m criterion ensures that 
the system is resilient against any m component outages from the set of components 
within the impacted area. It should be noted that if m components are impacted, there will 
be 2m possible failure scenarios. Since it is not practical to consider all possible scenarios, 
only scenarios with higher probability are studied. To do this, first the outage probability 
of potentially impacted power system components is determined, followed by calculating 
the occurrence probability of each scenario. Scenarios with higher occurrence probability 
are considered as the representatives of the entire outage scenarios. In addition to the 
proposed N-m criterion, the N-1-m criterion is also proposed and used in this study, which 
ensures that the system satisfies the N-1 reliability criterion for the entire system while it 
is also resilient against any m component outages from the set of components within the 
impacted area by the hurricane. For example, assuming we have 47 components in the 
system, and three scenarios for N-m criterion (top three scenarios with higher occurrence 
probability), in N-1-m criterion 50 scenarios are defined in the system, where 47 
scenarios representing the single component outage (N-1) and three representing outage 
scenarios for each path of the hurricane (N-1-m).  
Moreover, when a component is damaged by the hurricane, a certain amount of 
time is required to repair the component (known as time to repair or TTR). In (Nateghi, 
Guikema, and Quiring 2011), it was shown that the time to repair is a function of the 
number of crews, geographic characteristics of the area such as land use and land cover 
data, and climatic variables such as event duration and intensity. The time to repair of 
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each component can be seen as a random variable, due to variation in skill level of the 
repair crew and the random nature of the degree of damage (Arab, Khodaei, Han, et al. 
2015). This issue is further considered in this study. 
 
2.1.1. E-SCUC Formulation 
2.1.1.a) Outage Estimation 
The intensity and the path of hurricane can be obtained from weather forecast 
agencies. Component damages, however, are modeled using probabilistic models. The 
more accurate model to forecast the component damages based on the intensity and path 
of the hurricane, the more reliable system can be scheduled and operated. Unfortunately, 
there are not many data available for the impact of previous hurricanes on the system 
components (perceivably due to the priority in restoring the system and recovering the 
supply of power over event recording) and many utilities have trouble assembling this 
data even internally. Instead, stochastic modeling can be used to predict the probability of 
an outage of each component, assuming a certain probability model for each hurricane 
and the probability of the withstanding against wind gust speeds. 
In this study, two major components are identified for damage modeling including 
generation units and transmission lines. Damage state can be considered as a random 
variable with two outcomes: damaged and operational. Therefore, a Bernoulli random 
variable can be adopted to model the damaged/operational state of each component. The 
Bernoulli random variable, takes the value of 1 when the state of the component (UX and 
UY) is considered operational (with probability p); and takes the value of 0, when the 
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component is considered to be in damaged state (with probability 1-p). The availability 
function of each component against hurricane is considered as a dynamic stress-strength 
model as defined below: 
           
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where 𝑅(𝜏) is the reliability function, 𝑁(𝜏) is the number of hurricane strikes, 𝜏 is the 
time window of upcoming hurricane, and Gi is the outcome of the i
th random wind shock 
from the wind gust speed random variable G. In this study, the arrival probability of the 
hurricane during each operating period is modeled by Poisson distribution (Russell, 
Schueller, and others 1974), while the survival of component against wind gust is 
modeled by Lognormal distribution (Winkler et al. 2010). For the sake of simplicity, 
deterioration level of the component is not considered in the probability of outage in this 
study. However, the formulation is a general framework that can be expanded to other 
probability distributions. In addition, the time to repair damaged components is defined 
by the Weibull density function (2) 
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where 𝜌 is the shape parameter, and 𝜆 is the scale parameter. Which can be replaced by 
other probability distributions, such as Exponential, Gamma, and Normal, without loss of 
generality (Billinton and Wang 1999): Each component has different repair time and 
required set of skilled crews in practice. In this study, without loss of generality, a same 
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shape parameter and scale parameter is considered for different unit types, and the 
expected value of the time to repair random variable used as a reliable substitute for time 
to repair.  
2.1.1.b) E-SCUC 
The objective of the E-SCUC problem is defined as: 
  
t i t s b
btsitit vLCIPF ,min 0                               (3) 
where F(Pit0, Iit) is the operation cost in normal system operation (which includes the 
generation cost and startup/shut down costs) and LCbts is the cost of unserved energy at 
bus b at time t during contingency scenarios s. The value of lost load, v, is defined as the 
average cost that each type of customer - residential, commercial, or industrial - is willing 
to pay in order to avoid load interruptions (Economics 2013). Assuming UXits as the 
outage state of unit i at time t in scenario s (1 when operating and 0 when on outage) and 
UYlts as the outage state of line l at time t in scenario s (1 when operating and 0 when on 
outage), the proposed objective function is subject to the following operational 
constraints:  
tsbDLCPLP btbts
Bi Bi
itsits  
 
,,  (4) 
tsiUXIPPUXIP itsitiitsitsiti  ,,
maxmin
 (5) 
tsiURPP istiits   ,,)1(  (6) 
tsiDRPP iitssti  ,,)1(  (7) 
  tiIIUTT tiitiit   ,)1(on  (8) 
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Load balance equation (4) ensures that the total injected power to each bus from 
generation units and line flows is equal to the total consumed load at each load bus. Load 
curtailment variable (LCbts) is further added to the load balance equation to ensure a 
feasible solution when there is not sufficient generation to supply loads (due to outage of 
power system components). Load curtailment will be zero under normal operation 
conditions. Generation unit output power is limited by its capacity limit and will be set to 
zero depending on its commitment and outage states (5). Generation units are further 
subject to prevailing technical constraints including ramp up and down rate limits (6)-(7), 
minimum up and down time limits (8)-(9). System operating reserve requirement is 
represented in (10). The change in unit generation is further limited by the maximum 
permissible limit between normal and contingency scenarios (11). Transmission line 
capacity limits and power flow constraints are modeled by (12) and (13), respectively, in 
which the outage state is included to effectively model the line outages in contingency 
scenarios. 
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The proposed model ensures that the obtained unit schedule provides a cost-
effective solution in normal system operation and a secure solution in case of multiple 
component outages. Component outages are handled by a combination of proper 
preventive actions (i.e., commitment of additional generation units) as well as corrective 
actions (i.e., generation redispatch of committed units). The outcome of this model is an 
event-driven SCUC model that can be utilized when an extreme event is forecasted to 
approach the system, thus assuring that the system is ready to face the event and the 
probable load curtailments in response to multiple component outages will be reduced. 
 
2.2. Component Outage Estimation Based on KDE 
 Figure 2-2 depicts the outline of the proposed E-SCUC model. The model has 
three stages. In Stage-1, the category and the path of the potential hurricane that is 
heading toward the power system is forecasted. This forecast data can be obtained from 
weather forecast channels. In Stage-2, after knowing the potential regions and the 
category of the hurricane, the outage probability of each system component is calculated 
using KDE method on historical hurricane data. As the publicly available data on the 
impact of hurricanes on power system components is limited, an artificial set of data is 
generated in this study to estimate the probability of the component outages. Once the 
probable damages to system components are estimated, the E-SCUC problem based on 
the obtained scenarios of outages is solved in Stage-3.  
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FIGURE 2-2- PROPOSED E-SCUC MODEL WITH MACHINE LEARNING-BASED OUTAGE 
ESTIMATION 
 
2.2.1. Categories of Hurricanes 
A hurricane is typically assigned a “category” of one through five based on its 
maximum 1-minute sustained wind speed according to the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane 
Scale (Schott et al. 2012). The minimum and maximum sustained wind speeds 
corresponding to each hurricane category are shown in Table 2-1. Category 1 and 2 
storms, with sustained winds of 74-95 mph and 96-110 mph, respectively, are less 
dangerous categories but however require preventive measures. Usually there is no 
significant structural damage to most well-constructed permanent structures or there are 
only minor damages to poorly constructed windows or doors. However extensive power 
outages may happen lasting from few minutes to several days. The U.S. National 
Hurricane Center classifies hurricanes of Category 3 and above as major hurricanes. 
Event-Driven Security-Constrained Unit 
Commitment 
- Optimal scheduling of available resources  
- Preventive commitment and corrective dispatch 
Component outage estimation 
- Determine the probability of outage based on KDE 
on previous hurricane data/artificial data 
Forecast the hurricane 
- Forecast the arrival time, category and the path of 
the hurricane from weather forecast channels 
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Category 3 hurricanes can cause some structural damage to small residences and utility 
buildings, particularly those of wood frame. There is a very high risk of injury or death in 
Category 4, and catastrophic damage will occur in hurricane Category 5 (Schott et al. 
2012). Since the extreme wind rating of utility structures is based on a three-second gust, 
it is also useful to think of hurricane categories in terms of gust speeds. A typical 
hurricane will have three-second gusts that are about 25% greater than one-minute 
sustained wind speeds (Brown 2009). Using this 25% gust factor, the minimum and 
maximum expected three-second gust speeds corresponding to each hurricane category 
are shown in Table 2-1. 
TABLE 2-1- SAFFIR-SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE 
 1-min sustained (mph) 3-sec gust (mph) 
Category Min Max Min Max 
1 74 95 93 119 
2 96 110 120 138 
3 111 130 139 163 
4 131 155 164 196 
5 156 180 195 225 
 
2.2.2. Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) 
The operational/outage state of a component can be considered as a random 
binary variable. A variety of probability distribution models have been proposed to model 
the probability of damages on the power system components (Arab et al. 2014; Abiri-
Jahromi et al. 2013). Given a sample 𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑑 from some unknown densities, the general 
form of a multivariate kernel density estimate at x is computed as 
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where K is d-variate function (the kernel), xi is the training example, n is the number of 
training examples and h is a smoothing parameter called the bandwidth. The bandwidth is 
a rescaling factor, which determines the extent of the region over which the probability 
mass for a point xi is spread. The kernel is generally chosen to be an even function, i.e., 
K(x)= K(-x), which usually integrates to one and has a mean value of zero. The most 
widely used kernel is the Gaussian of zero mean and unit variance as: 
K x( ) =
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   (15) 
KDE methods are not very sensitive to the choice of K, and different functions 
that produce good results can be used. In practice, the bandwidth plays an important role 
and has a great effect on the shape of the estimator. If the bandwidth is small, an under-
smoothed estimator with high variability will be obtained. On the contrary, a large 
bandwidth results in an over-smooth estimator and farther from the estimated function. 
Thus, the quality of a kernel density estimator highly depends on the choice of the 
smoothing parameter. A common way to estimate an optimum value of the bandwidth is 
by measuring the mean integrated squared error (MISE) between the density and its 
estimate integrated over the domain of definition (across the training examples) as in (16) 
(Wand and Jones 1994): 
        d dxxfxfhMISE h
2ˆ
   (16) 
 
In other word, a KDE with different bandwidth is applied on training examples 
and the bandwidth with minimum MISE is assumed as the optimal bandwidth. Figure 2-3 
illustrates the effect of bandwidth on KDE of a standard normal distribution. As shown, 
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small bandwidth (h=2) results a higher variability estimation and a large bandwidth 
(h=20) results in an over-smooth estimator, while the calculated optimal bandwidth can 
estimate the probability of random samples more accurately. 
 
FIGURE 2-3- KERNEL DENSITY ESTIMATION (KDE) WITH DIFFERENT BANDWIDTH TO ESTIMATE 
A STANDARD NORMAL DISTRIBUTION 
 
2.3. Role of Microgrids in Power System Resilience 
The path and the intensity of the upcoming hurricane, which can be obtained from 
weather forecasting channels, will be collected as a first step. Then, according to the 
potential regions to be impacted by the hurricane, the outage probability of the 
components in those regions will be calculated. Once the probable damages to system 
components are estimated, the buses in which microgrids are to be placed will be 
determined with the objective of minimizing the system total load curtailments. 
Component outages should be modeled by probabilistic distribution functions 
using the hurricanes’ intensity and path that are obtained from weather forecasting 
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agencies. Since there are not many data available for the impact of previous hurricanes on 
the system components, stochastic modeling can be used to predict the probability of 
component outages, which assumes a certain probability model for each hurricane. The 
components can have two states of damaged (i.e., on outage) and operational (i.e., in 
service). A variety of distribution models have been proposed to model weather related 
failure rate and probability of failure/damage of power system components (Arab et al. 
2014) (Abiri-Jahromi et al. 2013). In (Arab et al. 2014), the deterioration levels of the 
components have also been taken into account to calculate the probability of failure, 
where the higher the level of deterioration, the higher the probability of failure. In this 
study, the arrival probability of hurricanes during each operating period is modeled by 
Poisson distribution (Russell, Schueller, and others 1974), while the survival of 
components against wind gust is modeled by Lognormal distribution (Winkler et al. 
2010). For the sake of simplicity, the deterioration level of the components is not 
considered in this study. However, the formulation is general and can be expanded to 
other probability distributions based on the extreme weather event and components 
characteristics. By nature, extreme events exhibit a spatial dependence structure, meaning 
that neighboring locations within some distance show similar patterns, as well as 
temporal dependence, which can be seen from similar high values for two consecutive 
time periods (e.g. within hours). Each type of extreme event has different spatial 
dependency and pattern, as studied in this study. The components impacted by a 
hurricane may contain generation units and transmission lines. The objective of this study 
is to find the optimal size and location of microgrids in order to minimize load 
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curtailments in the entire system and to ensure a resilient operation. During normal 
operation, i.e., without any component outages, the loads are fully supplied by the 
generation units. In the event of component outages, however, loads in buses located in 
the impacted area will be partially supplied by microgrids. Two sets of binary parameters 
are employed to consider the failure state: UXits as the failure state of unit i at time t in 
scenario s and UYlts as the failure state of line l at time t in scenario s (in both cases, 1 
when operating and 0 when on outage). Since binary parameters can have only two states, 
Bernoulli random variable can be adopted to model the operational state (with probability 
p) and damaged state (with probability 1-p) for each component.  
 
2.3.1. Optimal Microgrid Placement Formulation 
The optimal microgrid placement model to ensure the system resilience against 
hurricanes is formulated as follows: 
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The objective function (17) is the cost of unserved energy during outage 
scenarios. The cost of unserved energy is the value of lost load (VOLL) times the amount 
of load curtailments in each scenario. VOLL represents customers’ willingness to pay for 
reliable electricity service in order to avoid interruptions, and is different for different 
customer types, i.e., residential, industrial, and commercial (Lotfi and Khodaei 2015). In 
this problem, it is assumed that the loads are supplied by the utility grid, and its operation 
is separate from microgrids’ operation, so the system operation cost is not considered in 
the objective function. Instead, there is a limited budget to increase the system resilience 
by installing microgrids with optimal size and location. This assumption is in line with 
practice for many electric utilities under deregulated environments that can use 
microgrids for reliability and resilience improvement but not for economic purposes. The 
constraints associated with the objective function (17) are defined in (18)-(28). The load 
balance equation (18) ensures that the sum of total power generated by generation units 
and the microgrid as well as line flow injections at each bus is equal to the bus load 
during all scenarios. The load curtailments variable LCbts will be zero under normal 
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conditions. The power output of generation units is limited by their capacity limits and 
can be set to zero depending on their commitment state and the failure state (19). The 
minimum generation capacity is considered to be zero to remove the need for accurately 
modeling commitment states in each operation time period. The change in the power of 
generation units between normal and contingency operations is limited by the maximum 
permissible change (20). The line flow is limited by the line capacity and outage state in 
contingency scenarios (21)-(22). If a transmission line is on outage, i.e., UYlts=0, its 
power flow would be zero and that line will be removed from the power flow equations. 
The microgrid generation at each bus in all times and scenarios is limited by its installed 
capacity (23). The microgrid installed capacity at each bus is assumed to be limited by a 
predetermined ratio of the maximum load at that bus (24). In other words, a maximum of 
kDb
max can be supplied by the microgrid where Db
max is the peak load at bus b. The 
amount of load curtailments at each bus in each scenario is limited by the amount of load 
not supplied by the microgrid at that bus (25). By changing the microgrid capacity, the 
load curtailments can be potentially reduced (Khodaei 2014) (Shahidehpour 2010). 
Furthermore, the sum of the investment cost of all installed microgrids in the system 
cannot exceed the available budget set by the system planner (26).  
Based on the definition, the microgrid is switched to the islanded mode in 
response to upstream network disturbances. Considering this, if any of the lines 
connected to the microgrids upstream bus is on outage due to the hurricane, the microgrid 
will be disconnected from the system. The microgrid operation state is defined as the 
product of failure state of lines connecting to the microgrid bus (27). If any of these lines 
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is on outage, the microgrid operation state ubts would be set to zero, i.e., the microgrid is 
in the islanded mode, otherwise grid-connected. The proposed constraint is linearized to 
ensure the MIP nature of the developed formulation as in (29). 
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When switched to the islanded mode, the microgrid load from the system 
operator’s perspective will be zero, meaning that the microgrid will supply its forecasted 
load, i.e., kDbt, thus the maximum microgrid load can be modeled as in (28). The 
proposed formulation efficiently models the microgrid grid-connected and islanded 
operation modes, while ensuring a reliable operation of the entire system in case of 
upstream network outages caused by hurricanes. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS 
This chapter presents the numerical simulations of the proposed approaches for 
enhancing system resilience. The proposed E-SCUC problem is applied to the standard 
IEEE 30-bus test system in Section 3.1.  In order to exhibit the effectiveness of the 
proposed model, three cases are studied as: Case 1) SCUC with N-1 reliability, Case 2) 
SCUC with N-1 reliability against m outages, and Case 3) E-SCUC with N-1-m 
reliability. The obtained results advocate that by increasing the number of simultaneous 
component outages, the operation cost increases, evidently due to the increased number 
of units that need to be committed in the normal operation and used in contingencies. 
Section 3.2 presents the numerical simulation of the proposed component outage 
estimation based on the machine learning method and the E-SCUC problem on the IEEE 
30-bus test system. The proposed KDE approach is trained on artificial data and used to 
estimate component outage. The outage scenarios are then used to evaluate the proposed 
E-SCUC in improving system resilience comparing with SCUC in three different case 
studies: Case 1) SCUC with N-1 reliability, Case 2) SCUC with N-1 reliability against m 
outages, and Case 3) Proposed E-SCUC comparing with SCUC. Comparing the results of 
E-SCUC with SCUC indicates that the proposed E-SCUC model is more resilient against 
multiple simultaneous component outages.  
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The optimal microgrid placement model ensures the system’s resilience is applied 
to the standard IEEE 30-bus in Section 3.3. Four cases are studied: 
 Case 1: Load curtailments calculation without microgrid installations 
 Case 2: Load curtailments calculation with microgrid installations  
 Case 3: Impact of the investment budget on system load curtailments 
 Case 4: Impact of the ratio of loads supplied by microgrids on system load 
curtailments  
The results demonstrate the importance of micogrids in power system resilience 
and show that increasing the ratio of the loads supplied by microgrids would significantly 
reduce the total load curtailments due to the capability of installing larger microgrid 
capacities. 
 
3.1. Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC) 
The proposed E-SCUC problem is applied to the standard IEEE 30-bus test 
system as shown in Figure 3-1 (“IEEE 30-Bus System - Illinois Center for a Smarter 
Electric Grid (ICSEG),” n.d.). A hurricane passes through three hypothetical paths with 
different intensities. The procedure introduced in (Arab et al. 2014) is followed to find 
the probability of survival for each system component in response to a forecasted 
hurricane. Particularly, based on the available hurricane data and maximum wind gust 
speed that the components can withstand (Lu and Garrido 2005), the probability of 
survival from each hurricane is found. The impacted regions are also shown in Figure 
3-1. Table 3-1 shows the components that are damaged in the path of hurricanes in three 
contingency scenarios (hurricane paths).  
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FIGURE 3-1- IEEE 30-BUS TEST SYSTEM AND THE FORECASTED HURRICANE PASSING THROUGH 
THREE HYPOTHETICAL PATHS IN THE SYSTEM 
 
TABLE 3-1- SIMULTANEOUS COMPONENTS ON OUTAGE ALONG HURRICANE PATH  
(L: TRANSMISSION LINE, G: GENERATION UNIT) 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 2 
m=1 L1 L3 G1 
m=2 L1, L2 L3, L2 G1, L3 
m=3 L1, L2, L17 L3, L2, L4 G1, L3, L4 
m=4 L1, L2, L17, L20 L3, L2, L4, L1 G1, L3, L4, L16 
m=5 L1, L2, L17, L20, L18 L3, L2, L4, L1, L16 G1, L3, L4, L16, L17 
m=6 L1, L2, L17, L20, L18, 
L30 
L3, L2, L4, L1, L16, 
L18 
G1, L3, L4, L16, 
L17, L6 
m=7 L1, L2, L17, L20, L18, 
L30, L32 
L3, L2, L4, L1, L16, 
L18, L17 
G1, L3, L4, L16, 
L17, L6, L5 
m=8 L1, L2, L17, L20, L18, 
L30, L32, L22 
L3, L2, L4, L1, L16, 
L18, L17, L20 
G 1, L3, L4, L16, 
L17, L6, L5, L9 
 
In order to exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed model, three cases are studied 
as follows:  
3.1.1. SCUC with N-1 reliability 
In this case, only one component outage is considered in each contingency 
scenario, i.e., an N-1 reliability criterion is imposed. The operation cost is obtained as 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
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$10,730. No load curtailment has occurred in this case, so the cost of unserved energy is 
zero and the system is secure against any single component outage.  
3.1.2. SCUC with N-1 reliability against m outages 
In this case, the calculated commitment in Case 1 is used to solve the problem for 
the m component outages along hurricane path in each contingency scenario. The purpose 
of this study is to identify how much load curtailment will occur if the system is 
scheduled for N-1 but is subject to an extreme event. Table 3-2 shows the system 
operation cost and the load curtailment (LC) of each contingency scenario obtained from 
solving the SCUC problem based on the identified outages. As the same commitment is 
used for each number of component on outage (m), the total operation cost is constant. 
However, the results indicate that by increasing the number of simultaneous component 
outages, the load curtailment increases drastically. In other words, although the N-1 
criterion is suitable for ensuring power system security in daily operation, but it is not a 
viable criterion when dealing with extreme events.  
 
TABLE 3-2- OPERATION COST AND LOAD CURTAILMENT OF SCUC FOR MULTIPLE 
COMPONENT OUTAGES 
 Total Cost LC Scenario 1 
(MWh) 
LC Scenario 2 
(MWh) 
LC Scenario 3 
(MWh) 
m=1 $10,730 0 0 0 
m=2 $10,730 180 0 0 
m=3 $10,730 180 33 146 
m=4 $10,730 180 180 146 
m=5 $10,730 180 180 348 
m=6 $10,730 180 184 348 
m=7 $10,730 315 373 834 
m=8 $10,730 318 373 862 
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3.1.3. E-SCUC with N-1-m reliability 
In this case, the proposed E-SCUC is used to consider the simultaneous outage of 
m components along with the N-1 reliability criterion. Particularly, 50 scenarios is 
defined in the system, 47 scenarios representing the single component outage (N-1) and 3 
representing outage scenarios for each path of the hurricane (N-1-m). Table 3-3 shows the 
system operation cost and the load curtailment of each contingency scenario obtained 
from solving the E-SCUC problem based on the identified outages. In addition, the cost 
increase and average load curtailment decrease compared to the SCUC with N-m 
reliability criterion (Case 2) are shown in Table 3-3.  
 
TABLE 3-3- OPERATION COST AND LOAD CURTAILMENT OF THE PROPOSED E-SCUC FOR 
STUDIED SCENARIOS 
 Total 
Cost 
Cost  
Increase 
LC S1 
(MWh) 
LC S2 
(MWh) 
LC S3 
(MWh) 
Avg. LC 
Decrease 
m=1 $10,759 0.27% 0 0 0 0% 
m=2 $10,865 1.24% 70 0 0 61% 
m=3 $10,874 1.33% 70 33.70 67 55% 
m=4 $10,890 1.48% 112.77 80 67 49% 
m=5 $11,259 4.71% 117.05 88 131 52% 
m=6 $11,259 4.71% 118.94 88 131 52% 
m=7 $11,315 5.17% 215.05     130    316 57% 
m=8 $11,320 5.21% 234.92     175     464 44% 
 
The obtained results advocate that by increasing the number of simultaneous 
component outages, the operation cost increases, evidently due to the increased number 
of units that need to be committed in the normal operation and used in contingencies. 
Comparing the results of E-SCUC with SCUC (Case 2) indicates that the proposed E-
SCUC model is more resilient against multiple simultaneous component outages as the 
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amount of load curtailment is considerably lower than SCUC problem in same 
contingency scenarios. This significant advantage is obtained at the expense of limited 
cost increase, which is less than 6% in all studied cases. The final decision on the number 
of outages, i.e., m, represents a tradeoff between solution cost and resilience that need to 
be made by the system operator.  
 
3.2. Component Outage Estimation Based on KDE    
The proposed component outage estimation based on KDE and E-SCUC problem 
is applied to the IEEE 30-bus test system. It is assumed that a hurricane passes through 
three hypothetical paths with different categories as shown in Figure 3-1 (“IEEE 30-Bus 
System - Illinois Center for a Smarter Electric Grid (ICSEG),” n.d.). Five hundred 
samples with different wind gust speeds around the center of the hurricane are generated 
following a normal distribution with a small noise (10%). Accordingly, a Gaussian kernel 
is applied on the center of the hurricane to estimate the probability of failure of each 
component. Figure 3-2 shows the estimated probability of component failure for each 
hurricane category. The optimal bandwidth is estimated as 4.86 (Category 1 & 2), 9.76 
(Category 3), 16.22 (Category 4), and 26.75 (Category 5). The proposed probability 
distribution functions can be better estimated if more significant and reliable data from 
previous hurricanes were available; however, the proposed model is a general framework 
that can be applied to any available set of data, with different degrees of accuracy, 
without loss of generality. In each hurricane path, based on the distance of each 
component to the center of the hurricane and the category of the hurricane, the 
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probability of survival is determined. Table 3-4, Table 3-5, and Table 3-6 show the 
probability of failure for different components in each studied area (shown in Figure 3-1) 
based on data mining and KDE on artificial data. Probability of component failure over a 
threshold of 0.1 is considered for component failure (shown bold in Table 3-4, Table 3-5, 
and Table 3-6). 
 
FIGURE 3-2- ESTIMATED PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION OF COMPONENT FAILURE FOR EACH 
HURRICANE CATEGORY 
 
3.2.1. SCUC with N-1 Reliability 
In this case, N-1 reliability criterion is considered in each contingency scenario. 
The operation cost is obtained as $10,730. No load curtailment has occurred in this case, 
and the system is secure against any single component outage. 
3.2.2. SCUC with N-1 Reliability against m Outages 
The purpose of this case study is to identify how much load curtailment will occur 
if the system is scheduled for N-1 but multiple components outage happen due to an 
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extreme event. In other words, the calculated commitment in Case 1 is used to solve the 
problem for the m component outages in each contingency scenario. Component outages 
along each hurricane path (contingency scenario) are shown bold in Table 3-4, Table 3-5, 
and Table 3-6. A cut-off probability of 0.1 is considered, i.e., any failure probability 
larger than this will result in component outage, while probabilities less than this will 
ensure that the component will continue to operate in the functional state.  
TABLE 3-4- PROBABILITY OF FAILURE FOR DIFFERENT COMPONENTS IN HURRICANE PATH 1. 
 Category 
 1 & 2 3 4 5 
Line 5 0.3882 0.4031 0.3646 0.3424 
Line 6 0.0393 0.2623 0.3274 0.3077 
Line 7 0.0099 0.2069 0.3067 0.2892 
Line 25 0.0045 0.1345 0.2722 0.2687 
Line 26 0 0.0264 0.1447 0.2091 
Line 27 0 0.0198 0.1188 0.1924 
Line 28 0 0.0006 0.0632 0.134 
Line 31 0 0.0004 0.0598 0.1309 
 
TABLE 3-5- PROBABILITY OF FAILURE FOR DIFFERENT COMPONENTS IN HURRICANE PATH 2. 
 Category 
 1 & 2 3 4 5 
Line 5 0.3397 0.4383 0.3802 0.3601 
Line 6 0.0676 0.292 0.3153 0.3083 
Line 7 0.0104 0.1781 0.2775 0.2816 
Line 21 0.0001 0.0775 0.2202 0.2483 
Line 23 0 0.0661 0.2088 0.2435 
Line 24 0 0.0064 0.0629 0.1819 
Line 30 0 0.0016 0.0494 0.1637 
Line 38 0 0.0001 0.0387 0.1387 
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TABLE 3-6- PROBABILITY OF FAILURE FOR DIFFERENT COMPONENTS IN HURRICANE PATH 3. 
 Category 
 1 & 2 3 4 5 
Line 5 0.3875 0.4541 0.3802 0.3053 
Line 6 0.0862 0.3082 0.3395 0.3057 
Line 7 0.0629 0.2769 0.3312 0.3032 
Line 18 0 0.0583 0.2253 0.2544 
Line 19 0 0.0758 0.2442 0.2638 
Line 21 0 0.0032 0.085 0.1698 
Line 15 0 0.0008 0.0617 0.1489 
Line 29 0 0 0.0393 0.1255 
 
Table 3-7 shows the system operation cost and the load curtailment (LC) in each 
contingency scenario obtained from solving the SCUC problem based on the identified 
outages. As the same commitment is used for each number of components on outage (m), 
the total operation cost is constant. However, the results indicate that by increasing the 
number of simultaneous component outages, the load curtailment increases drastically. 
For larger amounts of outage i.e. hurricane category 5, the SCUC problem is not able to 
find a feasible solution. The results indicate that although the N-1 criterion is suitable for 
ensuring power system security in daily operation, but it does not provide a viable 
solution when dealing with extreme events and multiple component outages.  
TABLE 3-7- OPERATION COST AND LOAD CURTAILMENT OF N-1 SCUC FOR DIFFERENT 
HURRICANE CATEGORIES 
Hurricane 
Category 
Total Cost LC Scenario 1 
(MWh) 
LC Scenario 2 
(MWh) 
LC Scenario 3 
(MWh) 
1&2 $10,730 0 0 0 
3 $10,730 145 128 128 
4 $10,730 237 528 128 
5 - - - - 
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3.2.3. Proposed E-SCUC 
In this case, the proposed E-SCUC is used to find optimal scheduling of the 
simultaneous outage of multiple components along with the N-1 reliability criterion. 
Particularly, 50 scenarios is defined, 47 scenarios representing the single component 
outage (N-1) and 3 representing outage scenarios for each path of the hurricane (N-1-m). 
Component outages along each hurricane path are the same as components that are 
studied in Case 2 (shown bold in Table 3-4, Table 3-5, and Table 3-6). Table 3-8 shows 
the system operation cost and the load curtailment in each contingency scenario obtained 
as the E-SCUC solution. In addition, the cost increase and average load curtailment 
decrease compared to the SCUC with N-m reliability criterion (Case 2) are shown in 
Table 3-8.  
 
TABLE 3-8- OPERATION COST AND LOAD CURTAILMENT OF THE PROPOSED E-SCUC FOR 
STUDIED SCENARIOS 
Category Total 
Cost 
Cost  
Increase 
LC S1 
(MWh) 
LC S2 
(MWh) 
LC S3 
(MWh) 
Avg. LC 
Decrease 
1&2 $10,759 0.26% 0 0 0 0% 
3 $10,847 1.09% 0 0 0 100% 
4 $10,937 1.92% 0 87 42 85% 
5 $10,943 - 318 373 862 - 
 
The obtained results advocate that for more destructive categories of hurricane 
(where the number of simultaneous component outages increases), the operation cost 
increases, evidently due to the increased number of components that need to be 
committed in the normal operation and used in contingencies. Comparing the results of 
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E-SCUC with SCUC (Case 2) indicates that the proposed E-SCUC model is more 
resilient against multiple simultaneous component outages as the amount of load 
curtailment is considerably lower than SCUC problem under similar contingency 
scenarios. As an example, the load curtailment in response to a category 3 hurricane is 
reduced to zero when the proposed E-SCUC is utilized.  
 
3.3. Role of Microgrids in Power System Resilience 
The proposed optimal microgrid placement model is applied to the standard IEEE 
118-bus test system (“IEEE 118-Bus System - Illinois Center for a Smarter Electric Grid 
(ICSEG),” n.d.). It is assumed that a hurricane passes through the system under three 
path/intensity scenarios as shown in Figure 3-3. Since the probability and severity of 
hurricanes from the southwest side of the system are higher compared to those of 
hurricanes from other directions, only this section of the system is shown in Figure 3-3. 
The outage probability of components in the path of hurricanes is calculated based on the 
available hurricane data and maximum wind gust speed that the components can 
withstand (Lu and Garrido 2005), where those with higher probabilities are selected. The 
number of components on outage is changed from 1 to 9 in order to be able to compare 
the results. Table 3-9 represents the components that are potentially damaged. The annual 
peak load in the system is 3733 MW. For simplification, the hourly changes in the load 
are not considered, and the load is divided into three levels of peak load (3733 MW), 
intermediate load (3241 MW), and base load (2749 MW). The VOLL at all buses and 
ratio of the load supplied by microgrids, i.e., k, are considered to be $10,000/MWh and 
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10%, respectively. The microgrids capital cost and total investment budget are considered 
to be $1.5 million per MW and $70 million, respectively. The problem is formulated by 
mixed-integer programming (MIP) and solved by CPLEX 12.6 (“CPLEX 12, IBM ILOG 
CPLEX, User’s Manual, 2013,” n.d.)i. Following cases are studied: 
 
 
FIGURE 3-3- IEEE 118-BUS TEST SYSTEM AND THE FORECASTED HURRICANE PASSING 
THROUGH THREE HYPOTHETICAL PATHS 
 
 
3.3.1. Without considering microgrids 
In this case, the proposed model without considering microgrids is solved. The 
results are represented in Table 3-10. If there are up to two components on outage, there 
would not be any load curtailments in the system. By increasing the number of 
components on outage, the load curtailments, and hence the cost of unserved energy, 
would increase since the system cannot supply all the loads. 
 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
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TABLE 3-9- SIMULTANEOUS COMPONENTS ON OUTAGE ALONG THE HURRICANE PATHS 
 (L: TRANSMISSION LINE, G: GENERATION UNIT) 
No. of comp. 
on outage 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 2 
1 L33 G12 G4 
2 L33,L181 G12, L34, G4,L35 
3 L33,L181,L182 G12, L34, L43 G4,L35,L40 
4 L33,L181,L182,L41 G12, L34, L43,L42 G4,L35,L40,L37 
5 
L33,L181,L182,L41, 
L25 
G12,L34, L43,L42,L37 G4,L35,L40,L37, L39 
6 
L33,L181,L182,L41, 
L25,L27 
G12,L34,L43,L42, 
L37,L22 
G4,L35,L40,L37, 
L39,L20 
7 
L33,L181,L182,L41, 
L25,L27,L54 
G12,L34,L43,L42, 
L37,L22,L21 
G4,L35,L40,L37, 
L39,L20,L16 
8 
L33,L181,L182,L41, 
L25,L27,L54,L46 
G12,L34,L43,L42, 
L37,L22,L21,L26 
G4,L35,L40,L37, 
L39,L20,L16,L17 
9 
L33,L181,L182,L41, 
L25,L27,L54,L46,L47 
G12,L34,L43,L42, 
L37,L22,L21,L26,L44 
G4,L35,L40,L37,L39,L
20,L16,L17,G5 
 
TABLE 3-10- LOAD CURTAILMENTS RESULTS IN RESPONSE TO HURRICANE SCENARIOS 
WITHOUT MICROGRID INSTALLATIONS 
No. 
components 
on outage 
LC Scenario 1 
(MW) 
LC Scenario 
2 (MW) 
LC Scenario 
3 (MW) 
Cost of Unserved 
Energy ($) 
1-2 0 
0 
0 0 
3-5 60.8 66.4 1,271,806 
6-8 110.6 66.4 1,769,537 
9 201.8 758.5 9,603,675 
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3.3.2. Installing microgrids in load buses 
In this case, it is assumed that microgrids can be installed, in load buses, to help 
reduce system load curtailments as encountered in Case 0. Table 3-11 summarizes the 
load curtailments results with respect to outage scenarios, the buses where microgrids are 
installed, the total installed capacity of microgrids, and the microgrids costs. By having 
only one component on outage, there is no need to install any microgrids since the load 
curtailments is zero. By increasing the number of components on outage, microgrids 
would be installed in affected buses or their adjacent buses. As the number of 
components on outage increases, microgrids would be installed in more buses, and the 
microgrids total capacity would increase in order to compensate for the system inability 
to adequately supply loads. According to Table 3-11, the total load curtailments in the 
system would increase by increasing the number of components on outage, but it has 
decreased compared to that in Case 0. It should be noticed that there is not any outage in 
response to scenario 2, meaning that the direction of the hurricane in scenario 2 is such 
that the system is completely reliable and would be able to fully supply loads. 
 
3.3.1. The effect of budget on the microgrid capacity and load curtailments 
This case discusses the effect of budget on the microgrid installed capacity and 
load curtailments when all other parameters are kept unchanged. The results of N-9, i.e., 
9 components on outage, are represented in Table 3-12. Having the budget of $20M or 
$30M would result in the microgrid installation of 13.3 MW and 20.0 MW, respectively. 
In these two cases, the maximum possible capacity of microgrids would be installed since 
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the total capital cost is equal to the maximum available budget. By increasing the budget, 
the microgrid installed capacity would increase too up to 34 MW (associated with the 
budget of $55M) which acts as a saturation point. In other words, by increasing the 
budget more than $55M, the total microgrid installation would not change. It is 
noticeable that although there is an increase in the total microgrid installed capacity by 
increasing the budget up to $55M, the load curtailments does not change. The reason is 
that the objective of this model is to minimize the cost of unserved energy, not the capital 
cost. However, the load curtailments, and thereby the cost of unserved energy, would 
decrease compared to the base case under N-9 criterion, as shown in Table 3-12. 
 
3.3.1. The effect of changing the ratio of loads supplied by microgrids 
In this case, the effect of changing the ratio of loads supplied by microgrids, i.e., 
k, on the system load curtailments under N-9 criterion is studied. The results are 
summarized in Table 3-13. The parameter k is increased by steps of 5%. It is expected 
that following an increase in the ratio of loads supplied by microgrids, more capacity of 
microgrids be installed which causes the system load curtailments to reduce. Similar to 
previous cases, there would not be any load curtailments following the hurricane in 
scenario 2. It is observable that following the increase in k, the cost of unserved energy 
would significantly reduce compared to the base case with 9 damaged components. The 
increase in the total microgrid installed capacity would increase the total capital cost such 
that it reaches the maximum available budget when 25% of the load is supplied by the 
microgrids.  
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TABLE 3-11- LOAD CURTAILMENTS RESULTS IN RESPONSE TO HURRICANE SCENARIOS 
CONSIDERING MICROGRID INSTALLATIONS 
No. of 
comp. on 
outage 
LC  
Scen. 1 
(MW) 
LC  
Scen. 2 
(MW) 
LC  
Scen. 3 
(MW) 
Change in cost 
of unserved 
energy (%) 
Buses with 
installed 
microgrid 
Total 
Installed 
MG  
(MW) 
Total 
MG 
Costs 
(M$) 
1 0 
0 
0 0 - 0.0 0.0 
2 0 0 0 28,29,115 6.7 10.0 
3 
54.7 
59.7 -10.0 
28,29, 
114,115 
7.5 11.3 
4 
23,28,29, 
114,115 
8.3 12.4 
5 
17,20,23,28,2
9,114,115 
11.4 17.0 
6 
99.5 
16,17,20,21,2
3,28,29, 
114,115 
15.5 23.2 
7 
11,13,16,17,2
0,21,23, 
28,29,114, 
115 
26.5 39.8 
8 
11,13,14,16,1
7,20,21, 
23,28,29,35,1
14,115 
31.5 47.3 
9 181.6 732.5 -4.8 
11,13,14,16,1
7,20,21, 
23,28,29,33,3
5,114,115 
34.0 51.0 
 
TABLE 3-12- IMPACT OF THE BUDGET ON THE SYSTEM LOAD CURTAILMENTS 
Budget 
(M$) 
LC  
 Scen. 1 
(MW) 
LC 
Scen. 2 
(MW) 
LC  
Scen. 3 
(MW) 
Change in cost 
of unserved 
energy (%) 
Total 
Installed 
MG  
 (MW) 
Total MG 
Costs (M$) 
20 181.6 0 742.8 -3.7 13.3 20.0 
30 181.6 0 732.5 -4.8 20.0 30.0 
40 181.6 0 732.5 -4.8 21.8 32.7 
50 181.6 0 732.5 -4.8 30.0 44.9 
≥55 181.6 0 732.5 -4.8 34.0 51.0 
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TABLE 3-13- IMPACT OF THE RATIO OF LOADS SUPPLIED BY MICROGRIDS ON THE SYSTEM 
LOAD CURTAILMENTS 
k 
LC  
Scen. 1 
(MW) 
LC  
Scen. 2 
(MW) 
LC  
Scen. 3 
(MW) 
Change in cost 
of unserved 
energy (%) 
Total 
Installed 
MG 
(MW) 
Total MG 
Costs (M$) 
0.00 201.8 
0 
758.5 0.0 0.0 0 
0.05 191.7 745.5 -2.4 17.0 25.5 
0.10 181.6 732.5 -4.8 34.0 51.0 
0.15 171.6 719.6 -7.2 37.1 55.7 
0.20 161.5 706.6 -9.6 43.3 65.0 
0.25 151.4 693.6 -12.0 46.7 70.0 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION 
Resilience in response to extreme events is one the most important aspects of 
power systems. SCUC is commonly used for scheduling available generation resources to 
satisfy the forecasted load in response to limited components unavailability.  
In this thesis, an Event-driven SCUC model was proposed and developed to 
consider the simultaneous outage of several system components, representing an N-1-m 
reliability criterion. The numerical simulations on the standard IEEE 30-test system 
exhibited the merits and applicability of the proposed E-SCUC model in ensuring an 
economic operation under normal conditions and a resilient operation under contingency 
cases. Comparing the results of the proposed E-SCUC with the SCUC indicated that the 
proposed E-SCUC method is more resilient against multiple component outages. In 
particular, it can reduce the amount of load curtailment (~50%) compared to the SCUC 
problem, while resulting in a small cost increase (~5%). This survey studied hurricanes as 
a common form of extreme events. The proposed models, however, could be extended 
and applied to other types of extreme events with minimum adjustments.  
The proposed event-driven security-constrained unit commitment (E-SCUC) 
model was further studied by considering the simultaneous outages of several system 
components, representing an N-1-m reliability criterion. A KDE method, based on 
regression and data mining, was used to estimate and model the system components that 
will likely fail due to a predicted hurricane. An artificial set of data was generated in this
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study to estimate the probability of the component outages, as the publicly available data 
on the impact of hurricanes on power system components is limited. The proposed KDE 
approach is a general framework, which can ensure more accurate estimations if it is 
trained on extensive historical data from storm-related damages and their impacts on the 
system components. The numerical simulations on the standard IEEE 30-bus test system 
illustrated the merits and applicability of the proposed E-SCUC model. Comparison of 
the results of the proposed E-SCUC with those from the conventional SCUC without the 
events modeled indicated that the proposed E-SCUC method can produce a more robust 
solution that can protect the system against multiple component outages due to a 
hurricane.  
Finally, an optimal microgrid placement model to enhance power system 
resilience was proposed. The objective was to minimize the cost of unserved energy 
following hurricanes. For developing proper scenarios to model the impact of hurricanes 
on component outages, the probabilistic failure model of the system components was 
considered. The problem was formulated by MIP, solved by CPLEX, and applied to the 
standard IEEE 118-bus test system. It was shown that installing microgrids in proper 
locations would significantly increase the system resilience by reducing the load 
curtailments during contingency scenarios. It was demonstrated that increasing the 
budget would allow for installing a larger microgrid capacity, hence reducing the cost of 
unserved energy, while reaching a saturation point after certain budgets. It was further 
shown that increasing the ratio of the loads supplied by microgrids would significantly 
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reduce the total load curtailments due to the capability of installing larger microgrid 
capacities. 
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